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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-3145 
_____________ 
 
ROSS DRESS FOR LESS INC 
 
v. 
 
VIWP, L.P.; VIWY PP, LLC 
 
VIWY, L.P., 
   Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-12-cv-00131) 
District Judge: Honorable Juan R. Sánchez 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 5, 2018 
______________ 
Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
(Filed: October 24, 2018) 
______________ 
 
OPINION*
______________ 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.   
We are called upon to review the District Court’s order confirming an arbitration 
award.  Because the Arbitration Panel neither exceeded its powers nor manifestly 
disregarded Pennsylvania law, we will affirm. 
I. 
In June 2007, Appellee Ross Dress for Less, Inc. (“Ross”) and Appellant VIWY, 
L.P. (“VIWY”) entered into a lease establishing Ross as a tenant in a retail shopping 
center owned by VIWY.  The parties agreed to a co-tenancy provision, which required 
VIWY to maintain a minimum amount of tenants in the shopping center.  The lease also 
provided Ross with the right to pay a reduced rent should VIWY fail to satisfy the co-
tenancy provision. 
On March 14, 2011, Ross wrote to VIWY, claiming that the co-tenancy 
obligation had not been met since March 8, 2009.  According to Ross, it had overpaid its 
rent for two years.  Ross demanded that VIWY refund the excess rent payments.  VIWY 
refused.  In response, Ross began paying a reduced rent from March 2011 until 
September 2011, at which time VIWY terminated the lease.  
On January 11, 2012, Ross filed a federal lawsuit against VIWY.  Ross alleged 
that VIWY breached the lease causing Ross to overpay rent (the “overpayment claim”).  
VIWY counter-claimed that Ross had improperly offset its rent from March 2011 to 
September 2011 (the “offset claim”).  Additionally, VIWY moved to compel arbitration 
and dismiss the complaint.   
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The District Court denied VIWY’s motion and stayed the offset claim, pending 
resolution of the overpayment claim.  VIWY appealed.  We vacated the order and 
remanded the matter to the District Court.  We concluded that the terms of the lease 
required arbitration of the offset claim, but did not require arbitration of the 
overpayment claim.  Nonetheless, because the claims were “inextricably linked,” we 
reasoned that arbitration of both claims was appropriate.  Ross Dress for Less, Inc. v. 
VIWY, L.P., 570 F. App’x 123, 125 (3d Cir. 2014).  On remand, the District Court stayed 
the litigation pending completion of the arbitration proceedings. 
Six months later, on March 20, 2015, Ross filed a demand with the American 
Arbitration Association (the “AAA”).  VIWY raised a statute-of-limitations defense, 
arguing that because Ross had filed its demand more than four years after the alleged 
breach, his overpayment claim was untimely under Pennsylvania’s four-year statute of 
limitations.  The Arbitration Panel considered, but rejected, this argument.  The Panel 
reasoned that Ross’s filing of its federal complaint had suspended the running of the 
four-year limitations period, assuming the statute of limitations applied to arbitration 
proceedings.  The Panel explained:  
Pennsylvania law is unsettled as to whether its Statute of 
Limitations must be applied in private binding arbitration 
proceedings or whether applying the Statute is left to the 
discretion of the arbitration tribunal.  We need not decide that 
issue.  If the Statute were applied, we find that it was tolled 
when ROSS initiated its case in the federal district court. 
 
. . .  
 
The monetary value of this dispute is not less than $50,000 
and it did not settle in mediation.  It is not “a matter for 
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arbitration as described in Section 20.2.1.1” of the Lease.  
Therefore, ROSS complied with the Lease by initiating the 
Court Action, thereby tolling the Pennsylvania Statute of 
Limitations, if it is applicable to this private binding 
arbitration proceeding. 
 
Further, VIWY having prevailed in moving the federal district 
court to send the dispute to private arbitration, after the 4 year 
statutory period, cannot now successfully argue that ROSS’ 
claim is barred by the Pennsylvania Statute of Limitations. 
 
ROSS timely filed the Court Action in January, 2012 and has 
never stopped pursuing the Action.  The purposes behind the 
Pennsylvania Statute of Limitations are not violated by 
allowing ROSS claim to proceed.  
   
(JA 87–88.)  Turning to the merits, the Panel concluded that VIWY breached the lease 
agreement and, as such, awarded Ross over $1.8 million.  
Following the Panel’s decision, Ross moved the District Court to confirm the 
arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 9.  VIWY 
cross-moved to vacate the arbitration award, arguing that the Panel: (1) exceeded its 
powers under the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4); or alternatively (2) acted in manifest 
disregard of Pennsylvania law.  The District Court rejected VIWY’s arguments, denied 
its motion to vacate, and granted Ross’s motion to confirm the award.  VIWY timely 
appealed. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  When reviewing a district court’s 
confirmation of an arbitration award, we review legal conclusions de novo and factual 
findings for clear error.  China Minmetals Materials Imp. and Exp. Co. v. Chi Mei 
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Corp., 334 F.3d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 2003).  Our review of the arbitrator’s decision, in turn, 
“could be generously described only as extremely deferential.”  Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 
F.3d 365, 372 (3d Cir. 2003).  
III. 
VIWY renews its arguments that the arbitration award should be vacated because 
the Arbitration Panel exceeded its powers and manifestly disregarded Pennsylvania law.  
We will affirm for the following reasons.  
A. 
First, VIWY contends the Panel exceeded its powers when it allegedly misapplied 
Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations.  See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (permitting vacatur of an 
arbitration award “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers . . . .” ).  “Courts should 
vacate an arbitration award if: (1) the form of an award cannot ‘be rationally derived 
either from the agreement between the parties or from the parties submissions to the 
arbitrators’ or (2) the terms of the award are ‘completely irrational.’”  PMA Capital Ins. 
Co. v. Platinum Underwriters Berm., Ltd., 400 F. App’x 654, 655–56 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Mut. Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co. v. Norad Reinsurance Co., 868 F.2d 52, 
56 (3d Cir. 1989)).   
Exceeding one’s powers, however, is not synonymous with making a mistake.  
As the Supreme Court explained while affirming our decision in Sutter v. Oxford Health 
Plans LLC, 675 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2012): 
A party seeking relief under [§ 10(a)(4)] bears a heavy burden.  
It is not enough to show that the arbitrator committed an 
error—or even a serious error.  Because the parties bargained 
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for the arbitrator’s construction of their agreement, an arbitral 
decision even arguably construing or applying the contract 
must stand, regardless of a court’s view of its (de)merits.  Only 
if the arbitrator acts outside the scope of his contractually 
delegated authority—issuing an award that simply reflects his 
own notions of economic justice rather than drawing its 
essence from the contract—may a court overturn his 
determination.  So the sole question for us is whether the 
arbitrator (even arguably) interpreted the parties’ contract, not 
whether he got its meaning right or wrong. 
 
 Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 569 (2013) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted). 
VIWY argues that the Panel exceeded its powers because Ross filed its demand 
with the AAA more than four years after the alleged breach.  Thus, Ross’s request to 
arbitrate the overpayment claim was untimely under Pennsylvania’s four-year statute of 
limitations.  However, as was the case in Oxford Health Plans LLC, “we have already all 
but answered [this] question just by summarizing the [Panel’s] decision[].”  Id. at 570.  
When presented with VIWY’s statute-of-limitations defense, the Arbitration Panel 
assumed it applied to arbitration proceedings and analyzed whether tolling was 
warranted.  According to the Panel, Ross’s federal complaint asserting the overpayment 
claim, which was filed well within the four-year statute of limitations, tolled the 
limitations period.  Ross had complied with the terms of the lease, including the 
arbitration provision, and Pennsylvania’s limitations period when it initially filed in 
federal court.  Thus, this was not an instance where Ross’s own mistake or dilatoriness 
resulted in the late filing before the AAA.   
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In any event, an erroneous ruling that Ross’s federal lawsuit tolled the statute of 
limitations does not amount to an excessive use of the Panel’s power.  See id. at  572–73 
(“All we say is that convincing a court of an arbitrator’s error—even his grave error—is 
not enough.  So long as the arbitrator was ‘arguably construing’ the contract—which this 
one was—a court may not correct his mistakes under § 10(a)(4).  The potential for those 
mistakes is the price of agreeing to arbitration.”) (internal citation omitted).  This is 
especially true given the uncertainty present in this area of law.  We also note that 
VIWY took the position in prior proceedings in this matter that an arbitrator should 
resolve Ross’s overpayment claim.  Resolution of Ross’s overpayment claim necessarily 
included determining how Pennsylvania law, and in particular Pennsylvania’s statute of 
limitations, affected the parties’ rights under the lease agreement.  The fact that the 
Panel’s interpretation “went against” VIWY does not give VIWY the right “to rerun the 
matter in a court.”  Id. at 573.  
B. 
 Alternatively, VIWY argues that the arbitration award should be vacated because 
the Panel acted in manifest disregard of the law when it allegedly misapplied 
Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations. 
 In Local 863 International Brotherhood. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
Warehousemen and Helpers of America. v. Jersey Coast Egg Producers, Inc., we wrote 
that “[a]n award may be set aside only in limited circumstances, for example, where the 
arbitrator’s decision evidences manifest disregard for the law rather than an erroneous 
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interpretation of the law.”  773 F.2d 530, 533 (3d Cir. 1985).1  Here, the Arbitration 
Panel did not “willfully flout” Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations and its tolling 
jurisprudence.  Rather, it recognized the statute of limitations, assumed it applied, 
analyzed whether the statute of limitations was tolled, and concluded that Ross’s 
demand was timely.  This considered analysis did not constitute manifest disregard.  The 
timeliness of Ross’s demand was hotly debated due to the possibility of tolling.  Because 
the answer to the tolling question was not obvious, we cannot say that the Arbitration 
Panel manifestly disregarded Pennsylvania’s law concerning the statute of limitations. 
III.  
For these reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court dated September 
20, 2017. 
                                              
1  In Hall Street Associates L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., the Supreme Court called into 
question the viability of manifest disregard as an independent ground for vacating an 
arbitration award.  552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008) (holding that “§§ 10 and 11 respectively 
provide the FAA’s exclusive grounds for expedited vacatur and modification”).  We 
have yet to determine if manifest disregard survives Hall Street Associates. L.L.C.  
Despite an emerging Circuit split, we need not resolve this issue today.  Assuming, 
arguendo, manifest disregard supports independent grounds for vacatur, VIWY failed to 
demonstrate the Arbitration Panel manifestly disregarded Pennsylvania law.  
